Abstract
This paper considers the impact of the euro in Sub-Saharan Africa, looking at the transmission channels through which the euro could affect the economies in the region and at the risks and opportunities for Sub-Saharan African countries.
In particular, the paper looks into effects from the trade channel through changes in the European economic activity and real exchange rate. Because of a relatively low income elasticity with respect to primary commodities, which is what Sub-Saharan Africa primarily exports, any increase in activity in Europe is deemed to have an inferior impact on Africa. Exchange rate regimes and geographical trade patterns points to large differences in the exposure to changes in the real exchange rate.
Capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa can be affected via changes in foreign direct investments (FDI) or via portfolio shifts. The former is not expected to be under much influence from changes in competitiveness in Europe, and therefore no significant effect on FDI is to be expected. Portfolio diversification can potentially increase by a large amount. Realization of the increased potential is not to be expected because of severely underdeveloped domestic capital markets, which underlines the necessity for Sub-Saharan African countries to strengthen their financial integration with global markets.
Financial implications, such as affects on the banking system, and debt and reserve management, varies across countries but are in general expected to be of limited magnitude.
Thus, at this stage it is difficult to conclude that the euro will result in an important macroeconomic impact in Sub-Saharan Africa unless the launch of the euro becomes a tool of a major policy shift, "euroization" of the continent, which is itself unlikely at the current stage.
Introduction
January 1, 1999, marked the beginning of a new era of European economic and monetary union (EMU) as 11 of the 15 members of the European Union (EU) adopted a single currency, the euro. The 11 countries have a combined population of 290.5 million people and a total 1997 GDP of $5,890,291 million, making the euro a dominant currency on world markets and a potential challenge to the leadership of the U.S. dollar.
1 Most analysts have focused on the impact of the euro on participating countries and their neighbors and on Latin American countries 2 .
This paper considers the impact of the euro in Sub-Saharan Africa, looking at the transmission channels through which the euro could affect the economies in the region and at the risks and opportunities for Sub-Saharan African countries. It examines economic relations between Sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union and the financial relations between them, looking especially at foreign direct investment, European interest rate volatility, and portfolio diversification considerations. It also considers the financial implications for the banking system and foreign debt and reserve management.
Although African countries will be affected by all of these factors, none is likely to be of macroeconomic importance to them.
Economic relations between the European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa
Given the size and economic influence of the euro area, the EMU has the potential to significantly influence Sub-Saharan Africa's external trade and economic activity.
The Sub-Sahara African market
The market potential of Sub-Saharan Africa is considerable. The region has a combined population of 628 million people and a GDP of $913 billion. (table 1) . 3 Nigeria is by far, the single largest country in terms of population-at 121 million inhabitants it is more than double the size of the second largest country. But most countries in the region are relatively small, including the 14 CFA countries, whose population totals 97 million. 4 In terms of total income, South Africa is the largest. 
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Note: OECD import data are used to get a picture of Sub-Saharan African exports because of problems with missing or unreliable data when the reporting country is from Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: OECD; UN Comtrade; and World Bank 1999b,c. years (Ng and Yeats 1997 The importance of EU trade for Sub-Saharan Africa means that any impact of the euro on GDP growth within Europe can have spillover effects on economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa. The effect of the euro on economic activity in Europe is expected to be positive, as elimination of exchange rate risk and reductions in transaction costs result in increased economic integration and competition within the European Union. The spillover effects on economic activity in Sub-Saharan African countries will depend on the degree and nature of market integration between the two regions.
Since primary commodities, which generally have a low income elasticity, account for the greatest share of exports from Sub-Saharan Africa, any increase in exports to EMU countries induced by economic growth in Europe will be limited. Desruelle et al. (1998) estimate that the medium-term impact on CFA members of a 1 percent increase in euroarea GDP would be a 0.6 percent increase in exports and a 0.2 percent increase in GDP.
The improvements in euro-area competitiveness are likely to come, however, at least in part at the expense of exporters from other regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa. The elimination of exchange rate risk and transaction costs within Europe could result in trade diversion and a reduction of imports from outside the European Union. Since few SubSaharan African exports are in direct competition with goods produced in Europe, 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 Sub-Saharan Africa High income:
Source: World Bank1999b,c.
however, any adverse impact on African exports is likely to be slight. A more significant effect could arise from progress in reforming the EU Common Agricultural Policy. The common policy was discussed recently, but none of the issues under discussion is likely to have any substantial effects for Sub-Saharan Africa countries.
Trade effects through changes in the euro real exchange rate
The real exchange rate is another channel through which the euro could affect African exports to Europe. Again, the composition of exports from Sub-Saharan African countries is a central variable, but the lack of estimates for the elasticity of exports to changes in the real exchange rate makes it hard to estimate the sensitivity of exports to such changes.
The effect of changes in the real exchange rate depends on the exchange rate regime in each country (table 3) and on geographical trade patterns. Countries that peg their exchange rate to the euro would expect a loss of competitiveness relative to third parties if Pegged to the South African rand Dual exchange rate structure. Official rate applies to goods and services and debt-service payments of the government. The U.S. dollar is the principal intervention currency External value determined in the interbank market External value determined in the interbank market Multible exchange rate structure. Market-determined official rate External value determined in the exchange market. The US dollar is the intervention currency. Source: IMF 1998. the euro appreciates, an effect that will be stronger the smaller is the euro area's share in total trade (see table 4 ). Countries that peg to a basket of currencies of their main trading partners will not be quite as exposed and vulnerable to fluctuations in the euro. CFA members are among the most exposed and vulnerable to a loss of competitiveness. If the euro appreciates relative to the U.S. dollar, countries with a relatively low share of exports going to the European Union would be the most affected. Among these are Benin (16.9 %), Togo (15.8 %), Senegal (14.7 %), Guinea-Bissau (14.4 %), and Gabon (12.8 %).
Cameroon is the only CFA country with more than half its exports going to the European Union (73 percent). 
Capital flows between the European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa
The EMU can potentially affect Sub-Saharan Africa countries through many different financial linkages: capital markets, foreign direct investment, interest rates, and portfolio diversification.
Country risk ratings and access to international capital markets
The importance of the various financial channels depends on the degree of financial integration of the two regions. Similar studies for other regions use credit ratings from 
Foreign direct investment
The distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Sub-Saharan Africa is very unequal:
South Africa and Nigeria alone accounted for 68 percent of FDI in 1997 (chart 2). It is argued that one effect of the EMU would be to redirect European foreign investments back into the euro area as lower transaction costs make investments in the euro area more attractive. But investors will already have anticipated this decline in transaction costs earlier on, and FDI has continued to flourish in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years (chart 2 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 :Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa Nigeria Angola
Source: World Bank 1999c.
Mediterranean and Yeyati and Sturtznegger (1999) for countries in Latin America. 
European interest rate level and volatility
The impact of the euro on Sub-Saharan Africa through its effect on European interest rates depends on the actual affects on the level and volatility of interest rates in Europe and the channels through which these impacts affect countries outside of Europe. This section seeks answers to these questions but leaves consequences for foreign debt management for section 4.2.
The effects of the euro on the level and volatility of the interest rate in Europe are hard to predict and isolate. The current real interest rate level is at a historical low, which more or less excludes any significant decrease as a result of the euro launch. Likewise, the initial months of the euro launch have, to some extent, reinforced the expectation that the European Central Bank will pursue a relatively strict anti-inflationary policy in order to gain credibility (and in pursuit of its primary goal, price stability). In the longer run, however, the central bank may find it feasible to loosen monetary policy. The positive growth effect expected from the EMU should stimulate investment demand and pull up interest rates, though whether that comes to pass depends to some extent on whether the structural reforms widely deemed necessary, especially labor market reform, take place.
The bottom line is that the future level and volatility of European interest rates depend on a range of factors whose effects work in different directions. No matter what the net effect turns out to be, however, the impact on Sub-Saharan Africa through capital flows is likely to be minor. Theory predicts that countries that peg their currency to the euro will be more exposed to volatility in the European interest rate than countries with flexible exchange rate regimes, whose real exchange rates can absorb some of the volatility. Again, a key determining feature is underdeveloped capital markets, which to a large extent insulate Sub-Saharan African economies from the events that influence international capital flows.
Portfolio diversification effects
The basic idea behind portfolio management is to find a balance between risk and return.
The launch of the euro has decreased much of the risk, and hence also the return, in many EMU countries, particularly those in southern Europe. For example, the interest rate spread on long-term government bonds between Germany and Spain, Portugal, and Italy nearly vanished between 1995 and 1998 as the three countries followed a strict fiscal policy to comply with the Maastricht Treaty's fiscal requirements. Now that the euro is a reality, exchange rate risk has disappeared among EMU participants. What's left are the perceived differences in country risks related to such factors as differences in liquidity. Even though the famous "no-bailout" clause (Maastricht Treaty, article 104b) makes clear that countries will have to handle budgetary crises without help from other EMU countries, these differences in risk are perceived to be very low and are expected to remain so.
With the disappearance of most differences in risk among EMU members, a rebalancing of the risk-return mix now requires diversification outside of the EMU. In addition, the volume of funds seeking investment opportunities has increased, as the aging of populations in Europe swells the size of pension funds. Likewise, the expected increase in economic activity in Europe should also lead to increased savings.
Where will the portfolio shift occur? Are Sub-Saharan African countries likely candidates?
Not over the short and medium terms. For the most part, Sub-Saharan African countries lack the basic features needed to attract foreign private investors (especially pension funds), such as a long history of macroeconomic stability, good credit ratings (by Moody's, Standard & Poors, and others), and reasonably well developed domestic security markets and stock exchanges. In addition, some regulations affecting European institutions, such as the requirement for OECD membership (OECD 1996) for countries to receive investments, also make it unlikely that there will be any significant portfolio shift toward Sub-Saharan Africa countries.
In the long term, however, the euro has opened the door for portfolio investments for countries that pursue rigorous fiscal and monetary policies and that develop their capital markets. To tap into these funds, however, African countries will need to strengthen their financial integration with global markets.
Financial implications
The introduction of the euro could have financial implications for Sub-Saharan Africa in the banking system and in foreign debt and reserve management.
Banking system
The euro will work as a catalyst for the development of integrated money and bond markets in Europe, increasing competition among banks and between banks and other sources of funds. The greater competition between banks and financial systems in general should lead to efficiency gains in terms of resource allocation and ultimately stimulate investment and job creation.
Foreign exchange trading, corporate banking, and government-bond trading account for over half the profit of a typical large commercial bank. It is expected that European bank reserves will be reduced by 20 percent over the next decade in these three business areas.
The corporate banking sector is in for difficult times. The introduction of the euro and the creation of a single market in euro-dominated corporate bonds will make it even harder to lend money profitably to bigger firms. There will also be difficulties for the deposit and money market business. Corporate customers will no longer need accounts in various European currencies, so volumes will shrink. Banks will also lose profits from the money market as interest rate differentials between euro area currencies are eliminated. While these are areas in which business is expected to be eliminated or reduced, in other areas the EMU should create profitable new businesses. The market for euro-denominated bonds and bank profits from bond and equity trade could increase, for example.
How will these developments in banking systems in Europe affect Sub-Saharan Africa?
The short-and long-term effects are likely to diverge. In the immediate future, the euro may encourage nationally based banks, in Germany and elsewhere, to attach top priority to expanding their base across Europe. In the longer term, however, as the competitive situation within Europe heats up and margins are competed downward, a renewed expansion into more profitable non-European markets, including Sub-Saharan Africa, may again look more appealing.
Management of foreign debt
The euro can affect Sub-Saharan African countries' management of foreign debt through changes in European interest rate levels or changes in the real exchange rate of the euro, especially relative to the dollar.
The effect on debt service depends on the size and composition of the debt. For the region as a whole, the external debt in 1997 was 202 percent of exports of goods and services and the debt service was 13 percent of exports (table 6). These numbers suggest that any change in the European interest rates could have significant effects on the debt-service and so on development in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in countries where the debt service is highly exposed to changes in European interest rates.
The volatility of the debt burden depends on several factors: Many countries in SubSaharan Africa have a very large share of their external debt issued at concessional terms-38 percent for the region as a whole in 1997. 7 For some of the poorest countries, more than 90 percent of their debt is on concessional terms. When a large share of external debt is on concessional terms at below market rates of interest, the face value of the external debt stock is not a good measure of a country's debt burden. A better measure is the present value of debt. 8 The present value of debt is extremely high for almost all SubSaharan countries-above 100 percent of exports for most countries and above 300 percent for 13 out of 39 Sub-Saharan countries.
The impact of a rise in European interest rate levels on the debt service to export ratio depends on the size of the debt, the share of debt denominated in euros (or euro-equivalent currencies; see table 7), the share of foreign debt that is short term or variable-rate long term, and the degree of openness in the economy (see Feldman and Temprano-Arroyo 1998) . 9 For the region as a whole, a 1 percentage point increase in euro interest rates has a moderately low, though not insignificant, impact of 0.17 percentage point on the debt service to export ratio (table 8) The exchange rate regime (see table 3 ) and the share of euro-denominated debt in total foreign debt (table 7) should be harmonized in order to insulate a country's debt service burden from changes in the euro exchange rate. Several CFA members seem to be more vulnerable to euro exchange rate changes than others because the CFA members peg their currency to the euro. If the euro depreciates these countries will see a rise in debt service costs, the size of which will be negatively related to the share of euro-denominated debt; the opposite will occur if the euro appreciates. Countries with no "mismatch" between share of euro-denominated debt and exchange rate regime will be less vulnerable to changes in the euro exchange rate.
9 Let DSX denote the debt-service-to-export ratio, i euro denote the European interest rate, and ∆ denote a change. Then, algebraically the calculation can be illustrated with the following expression:
where the last factor boils down to the debt to exports ratio. The calculations depend on a number of assumptions, but can still give an indication of the magnitude of the effect that changes in interest rates in Europe will have on debt servicing. On top of the assumptions mentioned in the notes to table 7 and 8 of this paper, Feldman and Temprano-Arroyo also assume that all fixed-rate long-term debt matures within 10 years, with one-tenth of it falling due each year and being refinanced at an interest rate 1 percent higher than the original rate. This allows them to calculate the effects in the longer term, and they show that the effect increases in the longer term. A similar increase can be expected for Sub-Saharan Africa, but the effect is likely to be of a lower magnitude since the average maturity of loans to Sub-Saharan Africa is 20-25 years, while it is 10-15 years for Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, for Sub-Saharan Africa countries a much smaller percentage falls due every year. The dynamic effects also depends on how the matured debt is 
17.9
Note: EMU currencies include the Deutschemark, French franc, and Swiss franc and 50 percent of "other" currencies. Long-term debt is defined as debt with a maturity above one year. Source: World Bank 1999c. 
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Note: A number of assumptions underlie the calculations: (1) Euro-area interest rates increase by 1 percent in 1999; (2) there are no changes in domestic interest rates, exchange rates, debt stocks, or exports as a result of the change in euroarea interest rates; (3) the currency composition of short-term and variable-rate long-term debt is the same as that of total long-term debt; (4) the interest rate of the Swiss franc follows that of the euro; (5) 50 percent of the "other" currencies are from the euro-area. Source: World Bank 1999c and authors' calculations.
Reserve management
The European Union expects the euro to become a major reserve currency in competion with the U.S. dollar. Whether or to what extent this will occur has been a subject of considerable controversy among observers. Will countries in Sub-Saharan Africa substantially diversify their reserve holdings? If Europe succeeds in making the euro competitive, the euro could cut into part of the seigniorage currently accruing to the United States (this gain would, however, have to be balanced against domestic policy considerations, such as employment levels). The forces of inertia (and uncertainty about the new currency) will at first act to maintain the status quo. But if the euro proves to be a stable currency, some reserve holders in Sub-Saharan Africa may increase their euro holdings.
Reserve holdings of Sub-Saharan African countries totaled $18.2 billion in 1998, with average reserves of 1.8 months of imports. Countries that peg their exchange rate or wish to limit exchange rate fluctuations hold reserves to provide a cushion against negative net external cash flows on current or capital accounts. Dornbusch (1999) explains why countries hold reserves and the resulting complications as follows. Reserves are a substitute for adjustment when shocks are temporary and so justify financing rather than adjustment. In the case of persistent disturbances, reserves can help the economy get through the period before appropriate adjustment takes hold. In a world where there is only a single outside currency, say the dollar, the only relevant issue is to determine the appropriate level of reserves, taking into account the scale of the economy, the volatility of net cash flows, and the opportunity cost of holding reserves as measured by the differential between the return on reserves and the cost of capital. The costs of disruptive adjustment or unwanted exchange rate movements also effect the optimal level of reserves.
But since the world has more than one outside currency, the composition of reserves is also a critical part of the discussion. Not surprisingly, the answer is to hold a diversified portfolio of reserves whose composition reflects the shares of each currency in the country's trade pattern. The extensive indexation required for this exercize is too cumbersome in practice, however. Small partner countries' currencies or the currencies of countries with underdeveloped or unstable capital markets are likely to have high transaction costs associated with holding and managing a reserve position and therefore are replaced by a proxy currency. As previously argued, the management of external reserves should also take into account the currency composition of scheduled debt service payments.
Over time, the introduction of the euro will result in the creation of a deep and liquid capital market in Europe. The very size of the market will attract competition, reduce spreads, and hence offer holders of euro assets higher returns and better transactions potential. The euro will become, as a result, an equal to the U.S. dollar as a reserve asset.
In other words, reserve management will be able to get closer to its target, enjoy higher returns, and for a more diversified portfolio (in terms of risk exposure) still have a more liquid position than was possible before. All this because of the emergence of a single European capital market. That implies that, over time, as the capital market develops and becomes more attractive, reserve holdings will shift from dollars toward the euro.
Conclusion
This paper provides an overview of the potential channels through which the euro could influence African economies. European growth, trade creation and trade diversion, the euro's volatility, financial diversification by European investors, banking integration-all these factors will undoubtedly influence the decisions and strategies of the many actors that will directly or indirectly affect Africa. At this stage, however, it is difficult to conclude that these changes will result in an important macroeconomic impact unless it becomes the tool of a major policy shift: "euroization" of the continent, which is unlikely at the current stage.
